Ideas from 'On Sense and Reference' by Gottlob Frege [1892], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege' by Frege,Gottlob (ed/tr Geach,P/Black,M) [Blackwell 1980,0-631-12911-1]].

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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers

8187	Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Dummett]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

18772

We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

10424

A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Sainsbury]

18773

People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander'

14075

Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Gibbard]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

4978	The meaning of a proper name is the designated object

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms

10510

Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Hale]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names

18937

If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Sawyer]

18940

It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names

18939

In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism

9462	Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Jacquette]

18936

Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Sawyer]

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

10533

We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Dummett]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity

4893	Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Perry]

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts

18752

'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [McGee]

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions

22318

Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Potter]

4980	The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism

9180	Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Dummett]

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

4981	The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence

19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference

15597

Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Fine,K]

17002

Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke]

18778

Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference

7805	Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Benardete,JA]

4976	The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense

4977	In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference

4979	We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth

19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description

15155

Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Soames]

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics

11126

'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Margolis/Laurence]

8164	Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Dummett]

9817	Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Dummett]

8171	Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Dummett]

4954	Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke]

7304	Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Miller,A]